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1. Introduction
　Recently there has been much criticism from linguists, anthropologists, and philosophers for ap-
plying an ideological framework of “modern” western languages in order to understand Eastern lan-
guage practices (Nishida 1987; Suzuki 1997; and a panel of the 10th International Pragmatics 
Conference convened by Scott Saft, Sachiko Ide, and Wiliam F. Hanks1)). One of the most signifi-
cant discussions held was that between linguistic anthropologist, Michael Silverstein, and Japanese 
linguist, Akiho Yamaguchi (2007), who argued that the history of western linguistics can be consid-
ered an instrument of logic and reason whose practice is owed to the influence of “modern” western 
ideas of enlightenment, such as those presented by the Baconians. The Baconians’ central belief 
was that rhetorical linguistic expressions such as metaphors were obstructions in the pursuit of sci-
entific truth, and they sought to discover universal principles through focusing on logical and co-
herent aspects of discourse. As a result of this method, a number of important aspects of language 
practice (namely, the practical and social aspects of language) have been neglected. In the same dis-
cussion, Akiho Yamaguchi claims that such “modern” western ideas became the main stream of 
Japanese linguistic analysis, a fact that is evidenced in the example of the “nominative case” ga, 
which, as every Japanese speaker knows, does not always function as a “nominative” marker in Japa-
nese contexts. Tsurumi and Ikimatsu (1968) also emphasize the importance of emic perspectives of 
analyses, and suggest that every cultural outcome — including languages, religions, and lifestyles 
— includes the inhabitants’ perspectives on their social world, so that their own philosophy — 
which is cultivated within the context of their specific society — is immanent within those cul-
tures.  Such criticisms remind us of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which points to the interrelated 
and interactional connections between languages and their socio-cultural world.  
　This paper is an attempt to support the claims of such criticism. Through reexamining the Japa-
nese communicative practice of the negative interrogative from its emic perspective, I wil reveal 
what is missing in the previous studies, most of which have employed the western framework. Spe-
cificaly, I wil first present an interpretation of self in the “modern” western paradigm, providing 
an overview of previous surveys of the literature.  Next, I wil conduct practical analyses of ja nai 
in task-management discourse, and show how the participant attunes herself to her interactant by 
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supporting the interactant’s point of view in a way that could be seen to abnegate her identity. Last-
ly, in discussion, I wil argue that this tendency to self-abnegate or to insubstantiate the self may be 
linked with the Japanese consciousness of self and other, which may be grounded in Buddhism phi-
losophy.  
2. Preliminary discussion
2.1 Previous studies on negative interrogative
　The Japanese negative interrogative ja nai? (COP＋NEG?) is an oral contraction of “de wa nai ka 
(COP＋P＋NEG＋Q),” whose comparable English forms (i.e., “Don’t you〜?”) indicate the speaker’s 
assertiveness (Heritage 2002; Koshik 2005).  According to Ikeda (1967), who found a similarity to 
the English phrase, the function of the Japanese negative interrogative is almost exactly the same 
as its affirmative meaning, despite its structure having an interrogative form. That is, the negative 
interrogative shows the speaker’s high degree of assertiveness and certitude regarding what 
he/she is stating. In this sense, it differs from the basic function of most interrogative forms, 
which is to ask the hearer for information.  Similarly, Kawanishi (1994) points out that the nega-
tive construction ja nai attaches to the information about which the speaker is most sure. She thus 
names ja nai a non-chalengeable modal. What is common in those previous studies is that they are 
greatly affected by the results of English analysis, and regard the function as speaker’s property.
　Moreover, Miyazaki et al. (2002) point out that, in the case of the Japanese negative interroga-
tive, the speaker asks the hearer for an agreement on the information about which he/she is most 
confident. Here again, they focus on only the speaker’s attitude to his/her proposition, thus offering 
no chalenge to Kawanishi’s (1994) argument. We can infer from these previous studies that they 
consider the negative interrogative from a dichotomous distinction of speaker and hearer, and con-
ceive it only from the speaker’s perspective, rather than from that of the interactant. Namely, they 
apply an English dichotomous methodology of speaker and hearer even in analysis of Japanese prac-
tice, so that they are simply aware of what the speaker — that is, the speaking subject — believes. 
We can thus assume that their focus is only a single point of “self” which is revealed on a surface of 
communication. 
2.2 Western and Japanese structures of self 
　In the western paradigm, the speaker is the one and only center of language practice (Nishida 
1987; Machida 2003; Shimizu 2006).  According to the discussion between Silverstein and Yama-
guchi (2007), the speaker is the cogito 2) in which semantic thought is identified as an existence of 
socio-cultural interaction. Here, the cogito consists not only of nominatives in a semantic or referen-
tial sense, but also includes the speaking subject in the socio-cultural dimension. In other words, the 
semantic or referential dimension defines the socio-cultural dimension where the former covers on 
the latter. The Silverstein and Yamaguchi’s (2007) discussion demonstrates that the speaker’s self 
in the western world is a pivot of communication — i.e., it is foregrounded and identified as an inde-
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pendent entity from everything and everyone outside of it.  Kopf (2001), also addressing the rela-
tionship between this cogito and self-consciousness, writes:
While Descartes greatly contributed to philosophical discourse when he thematized 
self-consciousness and formulated the self-reflective and self-conscious “I” as the meth-
odological starting point of the philosophical enterprise, I think his formulation reveals 
three fundamental weaknesses: First, He reifies the experiential “I” as thinking thing; 
second, he equates the cogito and the self; and third, he fails to distinguish between the 
cogito as “consciousness of” and self-consciousness as “consciousness of itself.” (Kopf 
2001: 40) (underline mine)
This supports the claim that the concept of self is foregrounded, and is thus regarded as an inde-
pendent entity in the western structure of consciousness. 
　Japanese philosophers and linguists (Nishida 1987; Machida 2003; Yamaguchi 2004; Shimizu 
2006), in this sense, point out the dangers of adapting this western mode for thinking about Japa-
nese communicative practices. They claim that each language is unique in structure, since each is 
based upon a particular way of thinking (a claim which may recal again the Sapir-Whorf hypothe-
sis). My idea, therefore, is that the Japanese understanding of the self and of consciousness is funda-
mentaly different from that of English-speaking peoples, and this difference in understanding has 
profoundly affected the Japanese language on a structural level. 
　A number of studies on the Japanese language have been conducted which, by using a dichoto-
mous framework of speaker and hearer, demonstrate the degree of the speaker’s certainty about 
his/her own statements. Such analyses certainly help pin down for us the exact functions of the 
negative interrogative ja nai.  However, these explanations are not satisfactory when applied to 
real-life conversations. In the folowing sections, I wil demonstrate the ways in which the Japanese 
ways of thinking about self and other are unique.  Also, by reexamining practices of the Japanese 
negative interrogative from an ethnographical point of view, I wil show how the ideas of conscious-
ness are structured.
3. Data 
　The data consists of sixteen transcriptions of a task-management discourse between Japanese fe-
male native speakers3). Pairs of informants were asked to rearrange fifteen picture cards as shown 
below in Figures 1 and 2 to create a natural story. The original work by Lewis Trondheim (2003) is 
the story of a main character who, faced with the chalenging task of leaping over a cliff, is unable 
to successfuly complete the task after a number of ludicrous attempts. We asked, however, that 
the informants continue their task until they finaly agreed with each other that there was no cor-
rect answer. Their negotiations were videotaped by researchers. We arranged for two different 
types of groups, which varied depending on the level of intimacy displaced between participants. 
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The first group, or “in-group,” consisted of participants who were recognized as friends. The second 
group, or “out-group,” consisted of participants who had never met before. The total length of the 
data employed in this paper took about 126 minutes, and approximately 8 minutes were spent on 
each pair4). 
4. Analysis 
　The data ilustrates that the Japanese negative interrogative ja nai has the primary function of 
expressing an indeterminacy in the speaker’s recognition, rather than assertively requesting the 
hearer’s agreement.  Ja nai alows for the speaker to entrust the termination of the procedure to 
the interactant, and alows for the speaker to not have to emphaticaly insist on the accuracy of her 
own statement. 
　Example 15) is a conversation between “in-group” participants that occurs in the beginning of the 
negotiation. L in line 1 asks which of the three characters on the picture cards wil come in first 
place. 
 
[Example 1]
　01 L: Dare o saisho ni suru? 
 who OBJ first P do
 ‘Who do (we) put first?’
　02 R: Kore da yo, kore.
 this COP FP this
 ‘This one, this one.’
　03 L: A, honto da.
 oh true COP
 ‘Oh, (that)’s right.’
 ->04 R: Kore  ja nai?
 this COP NEG?
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　05 R: De: 
 and 
 ‘Aaand’
　06 L: De: , tanima  ga [at-te: 
 and gorge TOP exist-LK
 ‘Aaand there is a gorge.’
　07 R:   [Tanima  ga at-te: 
     gorge TOP exist-LK
     ‘There is a gorge.’
　In line 2, R proposes an answer to the interactant’s question. The proposal is preferably acknowl-
edged by the interactant in line 3, but she uses a negative interrogative in line 4. We should not un-
derstand this negative interrogative to be R’s request for an affirmative expression from the 
interactant, because L has already expressed such agreement in line 3. Otherwise, she would not 
continue her utterances in line 5 until she receives a comment from the interactant. 
　What is happening here is that, she leaves room for further suggestions to be offered from her 
interactant by showing her feeling of uncertainty through the use of negative interrogative, even 
though she knows she is getting the addressee’s consensus. Conversely, she never imposes her opin-
ion upon the interactant, but rather modestly approves of the interactant’s interposition as if to 
leave the decision-making to her addressee by dint of demonstrating indeterminacy toward her pro-
posal. This is the point most worthy of mention — indeed, more so than those points emphasized in 
previous studies. In addition, what can be inferred from this negotiation is that the negation 
marker nai can play an essential role for creating indeterminacy: it alows for the addressee to feel 
enough at ease to repeat the negative form, so that the speaker defers from the stated opinion. 
Thus, as this example indicates, the speaker attempts to settle it as an opinion produced by both 
participants, through the means of showing her modest attitude toward the proposal.  In other 
words, both participants share and consent R’s idea as expressed in line 4. As a result, in terms of 
evidentiality, they seem to perceive the source of the proposal as belonging to the common space of 
both participants’ consciousnesses, rather than only to that of their individual self’s or other’s recog-
nition. This is also shown by the fact that the interactant L permits R to carry on her with her 
turn, without expressing any disagreement, and to take over the story as in line 6. Here, we cannot 
recognize the speaker’s identity. Even though her idea is accepted by the interactant, she stil 
shows indeterminacy and attempts to abnegate her individual identity by not disclosing her eviden-
tiality. Therefore, R’s proposed and L’s approved information exists in the common space of the two 
participants’ ideas, so that the phrase ja nai both enhances the attention paid to the interactant, 
and attunes each other’s recognition.
　Example 2 below is a sequential organization of “in-group” participants, where the negative inter-
rogative ja nai serves as an answer to a question-answer adjacency pair. While ja nai has been dealt 
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with in terms of the speaker’s viewpoint — that is, asking for confirmation (Kokuritsu kokugo 
kenkyusho (Ed.) 1960; Hasunuma 1995 etc.) — this explanation has several limitations when ap-
plied to Example 2, in which ja nai serves as the addressee’s utterance by showing her in agree-
ment with the questioner. 
　Participants are talking about how they wil tackle the given task. R takes a hint from L’s utter-
ance in line 1 that some cards look similar, and suggests in line 2 that it may work if they colect 
similar cards together. The R’s suggestion is preferably acknowledged by L. L then takes part in 
colecting similar cards as in line 4. From this point on, the conversation seems to carry on 
smoothly within a sealed consensus. 
[Example 2]
　01 L: Nan- kore to kore, onaji yoona mono da to omou kedo, 
 what this and this same like thing COP P think CONJ
 kore dooshita no tte kanji da yo ne.
 this what’s-happening Q LK like COP FP FP
 ‘Like- (I) think this and this look similar, but it is like “what’s happening?” here.’ 
　02 R: Tashikani, zenbu koo yat-te matome reba i : n da yo, onaji yatsu dake.
 right al this do-LK colect CONJ good N COP FP same thing only
 ‘Right, (it) works wel if (we) colect the same cards al together like this.’  
　03 R: Kore, [desho: 
 this   COP+AUX
 ‘This wil goes with (the one I focus on).’
　04 L:  [Kore a to, kore b mo da yo ne.
  　　 this a and this b too COP FP FP
  　　 ‘This aone goes with this b one, right.’ 
　05 R: Kore cmo kore d da to omou?
 this c too this d COP P think
 ‘Do (you) think this cone goes with this d one?’
 ->06 L: Ja nai? =
 COP NEG?
　07 R:  =Kore-ppoi ne
   　　  this-like FP
   　　  ‘(It’s) likely.’
　Here, I would like to pay close attention to lines 5 and 6. Questioner R starts the first pair part of 
the adjacency pair in line 5, and L answers with “Janai? ” in response to it. It is obvious that ja nai 
here works by showing agreement to her interactant’s question, rather than by asking in the form 
of a question for information (as is the usual case with the interrogative).  This is also proved by 
104
Title:Yp099-111_落合るみ子.ec8 Page:104  Date: 2008/02/19 Tue 15:34:26 
The Japanese Negative Interrogative ja nai? and Insubstantial Identity of Japanese Self: On the Basis of Buddhism Philosophy
R’s immediate utterance “Kore-ppoi ne ” in line 7, where the final particle ne signifies a condition in 
which both participants share information (Cook 1990).  Now, one question arises: why did the an-
swerer not clearly state “yes” based on conditional relevance (Schegloff 1972) if she had agreed 
with the interactant? Let us compare an alternative expression — “Yeah, that’s what I’m thinking” 
— which may be a plausible answer in English conversation.  With this statement she would be 
able to display that her thought totaly matches the interactant’s opinion by showing that they 
have reached a consensus. At the same time, however, it could also convey the speaker’s epistemic 
authority (Heritage 2002) — i.e., that she had already known it before the interactant proposed the 
question.  It thus creates an individualistic atmosphere as if her thought should be distinguished 
from another. On the other hand, by using a negative interrogative form, she succeeds in encourag-
ing the interactant’s epistemic authority without revealing the individualistic atmosphere in mak-
ing use of an up-rising question form. 
　Furthermore, such a response would display the answerer’s harmonious attitude in support of 
the interactant. In order to recognize why ja nai is able to show the feeling of agreement without 
epistemic authority, it wil help to consider the function of the negative interrogative, which has 
been pointed out in the previous studies. According to Miyazaki et al. (2002), the negative interroga-
tive is a device used when the speaker requests the hearer to admit that the proposed information 
is appropriate — that is, when the speaker is confident of his/her own information. Although the 
addressee L in the adjacency pair does not ask R for confirmation from speaker’s viewpoint, she is 
confident of the accuracy and appropriateness of the information preceding ja nai. Therefore, she 
can convey the affirmative message with ja nai.  
　It is particularly worth noting that the answerer takes over a part of the questioner’s utterance. 
By simply saying “Ja nai?, ” she acknowledges the preceding information (i.e., ‘this one goes with 
this one’) while at the same time attuning herself to the questioner. We can infer from this negotia-
tion that the answerer immediately grounds the questioner’s information in her consciousness, thus 
finding a common ground. In other words, the information proposed by the interactant is promptly 
recognized and shared in both participants’ common space of consciousness, as is expressed in L’s 
harmonious reply in line 6. We can thus regard this L’s behavior as an abnegation of self or of indi-
vidual identity, so that she seems to behave as if both participants were one person. There is essen-
tialy no distinction between the self and the interactant. 
　From these examples, it is possible to see the Japanese conception of self as, in a sense, “insubstan-
tial,” since no clear boundaries between self and other are evident in either example. The partici-
pant in Example 1 conveys the feeling of uncertainty regarding her proposition — even after being 
approved by the interactant — and she attunes herself to the other while backing off from insisting 
on her original idea. Besides Example 1, the participant expresses her agreement to the questioner 
by using a negative interrogative, thus immediately establishing a common ground between the 
two. Ja nai thus succeeds in sharing presented information with the interactant by respecting the 
proposer’s epistemic authority. Consequently, the information seems to belong to both participants’ 
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common space of consciousness rather than their individual self’s or other’s recognition. Here we no-
tice that the distinction between self and other seems beyond separation in terms of their communi-
cation, so much so that the conception of the Japanese self can be wholy abnegated or made 
insubstantial in their negotiation.
5. Discussion
　My analysis has hopefuly demonstrated that the Japanese negative interrogative ja nai indi-
cates the speaker’s adjustable attitude to the interactant by showing uncertainty toward her own 
proposition even after being approved, and by encouraging the interactant’s epistemic authority, al 
the while taking over a part of the questioner’s utterance in the question-answer adjacency pair. We 
can infer from these practices that the Japanese participant’s recognition is apt to regard one’s idea 
as that of both participants, rather than individualizing each thought and assigning ownership. In 
other words, they seem to share a common space of consciousness, so that they wil not go on to the 
next step until the idea is shared in that space. Here, we cannot find a clear individual self, and the 
Japanese self therefore appears to be an insubstantial entity. 
　What can be grounded in this insubstantiality of Japanese self? I would like here to introduce a 
notion of self as understood in Buddhism philosophy. According to the precepts of Japanese Bud-
dhism, the self is conceived as inherently insubstantial, or as an entity that “fals off into Nothing-
ness” (Izutsu 1977). In other words, the “relative” self — which is always judged in comparison with 
something else — is not admitted (cf. Suzuki 1997).  Izutsu (1977) gives us a noteworthy explana-
tion on the self as understood in the native Japanese religion, Zen Buddhism:
The ‘self’ itself, the real subjective subject which goes on searching after itself, remains 
always beyond our reach, eluding forever our grasp. The pure subjectivity is reached 
only when man steps beyond the ken of the dichotomizing activity of intelect, ceases to 
look at his own ‘self’ from the outside as an object, and becomes immediately his own 
‘self.’ (Izutsu 1977: 4-5) 
What he points out is that the self is never a dichotomous part of object; in other words, distinctions 
such as “I” and “you” or “speaker” and “hearer” are not necessary to explain our behavior or the real 
world. Namely, the self itself is a more intricate entity, and is thus beyond such dichotomous dis-
tinctions — so much so that the independent self is not even recognized in Japanese conversation. I 
should point out that Buddhism does not deny the entities of “I” and “you” or “speaker” and “hearer”; 
rather, it holds such distinctions are never presented as final entities of the real world, but exist 
only as processes of non-intentional consciousness. In other words, the dichotomous distinctions 
such as “subject” and “object,” “I” and “you,” or “speaker” and “hearer” may exist only for the sake of 
expedience.  Ultimately, however, this manifestation “regains its own original unity” (Izutsu 1977), 
which is the intrinsic state of the Japanese self. We can infer here that al things are beyond sepa-
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ration in Buddhism philosophy. 
　Some may say that Buddhism is subtly imprinted in Japanese people.  Upon closer examination, 
however, we can see that Buddhist phenomena are actualy embedded in many facets of ordinary 
Japanese life, so that the Japanese are in fact wel accustomed to its major tenets. Buddhist folklo-
ric events are one example, among which is an annual event held in summer caled “Obon ,” in 
which family members and relatives invite their ancestral spirits to the home to be honored. When 
the holiday comes, they al assemble at the house where they and their ancestors were born, and 
spend time together with their ancestral spirits. Furthermore, Japanese are intimate with holding 
a folkloric Buddhist event named “Hoji ,” which is a periodic memorial service for ancestors. Again, 
not only the family members but also the relatives participate in the events in order to wish happi-
ness upon their ancestors in the afterlife, and to tel them that the living family members are al in 
good health.  Since Japanese people frequently partake in such folkloric Buddhist events in their 
daily life, and conceive of them as ordinary ritual events, Buddhism philosophy can be understood 
as being “unintentionaly” rooted in the Japanese consciousness.  This is why it is often inferred 
that the Japanese share a similarly Buddhist conception of self, which serves as a sort of communal 
“common sense idea” (Hanks 2005).
　We can find evidences of the Japanese insubstantiality of self in other linguistic features. The 
first evidence is that of the unmarked subjects in Japanese. As a number of studies have already in-
dicated (cf. Ide 2002), subject marking is not obligatory in Japanese language practices. It is already 
clear from Examples 1 and 2 as wel. Below is another example that clearly shows the unmarked be-
havior of Japanese subjects.
[Example 3]
　01 L: A, wakatta, saisho
 oh understand first
 ‘Oh, (I) understand, first’ 
　02 R: [Un
  yes
  ‘Yeah.’
　03 L: [Kono chicchai no de =
  this smal N with 
  ‘With this smal one’
　04 R:    =Un
      yes
      ‘Yeah.’
 ->05 L: “Pyo: n” to ikoo to shitara, tsuburechatta n jan?
 Onomatopoeia LK go P do have-been-mashed N COP+NEG
 ‘(He) tried to go like “pyooon,” but (the smal one) has been mashed.’ 
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　06 R: Aa: 
 oh
 ‘Oh.’
Example 3 is a negotiation of “in-group” participants where three different characters appear in 
their cards. After L attracts R’s attention in line 1, she starts to describe her idea in lines 3 and 5 as 
‘With this smal one, (he) tried to go like “pyooon,” but (the smal one) has been mashed.’ Here, we 
recognize that two subjects in each clause are unmarked. Moreover, those unmarked subjects refer 
to two different types of characters — the main character “he” and “the smal one” — in their cards. 
Nevertheless, interactant R has no difficulty in understanding what those references are, so that 
she expresses her acknowledgement in line 6.  What is happening here is that she is recognizing 
those references depending on their contexts or “ba ” (Shimizu 2006), which is the unintentional 
space for making expression6).  Since she is fuly embedded in the space where there stands no in-
tention or consciousness between participants, it implies that both participants seem to share a sin-
gle “ba, ” i.e., the common space of consciousness, as we argued in the above section. This can be 
related to Ide’s (2002) discussion that Japanese speakers have an insider’s viewpoint — that is, that 
they are embedded in the contexts. 
　Another instance is the grammatical feature of the negation marker, which is posited at 
sentence-final slots. Such grammatical binding enables the speaker to turn her affirmative opinion 
into a negative sentence, depending on her interactant’s behavior or reaction at each successive mo-
ment. The example from “out-group” participants shows:
[Example 4]
　01 L: Nanka kore-tte saisho, ni, mitsukete torini ikut-te kanji, [ ja nai, desu ka ne: 
 like this-LK first P find get go-LK like  COP NEG HON Q FP
 ‘It looks like, maybe he finds out (the stick) first, and, like, go get (the stick), or maybe not…’
　02 R:  (reluctantly) [soo desu ne: , kore wa, tabun,
    so COP FP this TOP maybe
    ‘Maybe so…, this one,’
In line 1, L embarrassedly states her opinion with frequent pauses. After saying ‘It looks like… 
maybe he finds out (the stick) first, and… like… go get (the stick)…,’ she perceives her interac-
tant’s reluctancy in line 2, at which point she turns her affirmative statements into a negative — or 
at least an indeterminable stance — by saying ‘or maybe not’ at the end of the utterance. Here, the 
negation marker nai at the sentence-final slot encourages the speaker to mend her attitude before 
deciding whether or not to make the sentence affirmative. Consequently, she succeeds in attuning 
herself to her interactant, who may be uncertain of the proposal. This evidence ilustrates the reluc-
tance on the part of the speaker to wilingly distinguish themselves from others, and thus shows 
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the insubstantial identity of the Japanese self.
6. Conclusion 
　The hope of this paper is to shed light on the elements neglected in the previous studies, most of 
which have applied modern western frameworks. We have observed from the emic perspective 
that the negative interrogative ja nai serves the function of attuning the speaker to the interactant 
by creating indeterminacy, rather than by showing the speaker’s assertiveness or certainty regard-
ing its proposition, or by requesting from the hearer an expression of agreement. Participants avoid 
clarification in order to make their independent identity inconspicuous, and to become merged with 
the interactant. In other words, even though one’s proposition has already been approved, she does 
not continue to the next negotiation until the idea is shared in both her and the interactant’s com-
mon space of consciousness.  This ilustrates that the Japanese concept of insubstantiality in prac-
tice serves to abnegate, or at least diminish, individual identity. We also demonstrated that ja nai 
was not always the speaker’s property, but rather that it also played a role for the hearer, as was 
demonstrated in the question-answer adjacency pair shown in Example 2. While in the previous 
studies, ja nai is regarded as only the speaker’s property, here we find that this is not always the 
case. Moreover, this supports the fact that distinctions such as “speaker” and “hearer” are not al-
ways necessary in Japanese negotiations — in fact, such distinctions between “speaker” and “hear-
er,” “I” and “you,” or “self” and “other” are inherently beyond separation.  Because such distinctions 
are often precluded in Japanese conversation, it can be said that the Japanese concept of self is itself 
rather insubstantial, and participants behave as if they were indeed one single entity. 
　We then discussed that this insubstantiality had originated in the concept of Buddhism philoso-
phy. According to the Buddhism philosophy, the self is inherently insubstantial so that there is no 
distinction between self and others. This insubstantial identity of Japanese self is not only a prop-
erty of Japanese negative interrogative, but also of other Japanese linguistic features, such as the 
unmarked subject or the negation at the end of the sentence. And from observing the ritualistic, 
folkloric events of Buddhism — such as Obon or Hoji — we can conclude that the philosophy of Bud-
dhism may be unintentionaly grounded in the real world so that it is an embodiment of a “common 
sense idea” (Hanks 2005), which is immanent in Japanese people who share the common world-view 
of Buddhism.
　
Notes
 ＊ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 10th International Pragmatics Conference 
(Göteborg, Sweden), 8-13 July 2007. 
 1) The name of this panel is “Toward an emancipatory pragmatics: Culture, language, and interaction 
in cross-linguistic perspectives.” They pointed out the dominant influence of western frameworks as 
folows:
Most, if not al, of the influential theoretical perspectives and analytic frameworks faling under the 
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label of pragmatics […] have developed within western academia and have been predominantly ap-
plied to Euro-American languages. Despite occasional concerns about the application of these perspec-
tives to non-western contexts, they nonetheless continue to be dominant in textbooks on pragmatics 
and language usage. (Conference Abstract p. 216)
 2) As Kopf (2001: 40) indicates, “the cogito became a philosophical entity with Descartes whose de-
clared project it was to find an indubitable ground of philosophy and of human knowledge.” 
 3) The data is colected under a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from the Japanese Society for the 
Promotion of Science, for the project on “Empirical and theoretical studies on culture, interaction, and 
language in Asia” (No. 15320054, directed by Sachiko Ide at Japan Women’s University). 
 4) Although there are different aspects in the data that depend on familiarity of the participants, this 
study mainly focuses on language practice of Japanese negative interrogative.
 5) Transcription conventions are as folows:
  : indicates prolonged sounds   
  [ indicates overlapping i.e. participants speak at the same time
  - indicates word spoken haltingly
  = indicates latching i.e. participant starts speaking without perceptible pause
  ( ) indicates word supplied to make English translation grammatical or inteligible
  AUX = auxiliary, CONJ = conjunction, COP = copula, FP = final particle, HON = honorifics, 
  LK = linking word, N = nominalizer, NEG = negation marker, OBJ = objective marker, P = particle, 
  Q = question marker, TOP = topic marker
 6) The similar concept of “ba ” (Shimizu 2006) can be an indexical field, or the place or space where 
socio-cultural interactions are conducted on the basis of origo (cf. Silverstein and Yamaguchi 2007). It 
is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to present the ful-fledged discussion. 
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